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Abstract
In almost every election cycle, the validity of the
United States Electoral College is brought into ques-
tion. The 2016 Presidential Election again brought up
the issue of a candidate winning the popular vote but
not winning the Electoral College, with Hillary Clin-
ton receiving close to three million more votes than
Donald Trump. However, did the popular vote actu-
ally determine the most liked candidate in the elec-
tion? In this paper, we demonstrate that different vot-
ing policies can alter which candidate is elected. Ad-
ditionally, we explore the trade-offs between each of
these mechanisms. Finally, we introduce two novel
mechanisms with the intent of electing the least po-
larizing candidate.
1 Introduction
In 1970, Salvador Allende, head of the Popular
Union party in Chile, became the first Marxist ever
elected to the national presidency of a democracy.
The only problem: the election mechanism used the
plurality rule. Allende won without a majority, hav-
ing only 36.2% of the vote and around 60% against.
[1] The following years were marked by significant
protests. Supported by the U.S. Government, a mili-
tary coup followed. The result was the fall of one of
the world’s strongest democracies to a 17-year mili-
tary coup (1973-1990). While the non-majority plu-
ralistic vote outcome was not the sole cause of the 17-
year dismantlement of democracy, the election mech-
∗https://github.com/darrenmei/election_mechanisms
anism design was certainly a strong factor in creating
the public sentiment that supported and allowed a mil-
itary coup to take root.
Why do election mechanisms matter?
Election mechanisms are of great importance to
governments. Elections dictate the future of na-
tions, and democratic countries often have very dif-
ferent mechanisms from each other. The rise of the
Arab Spring and increased criticism on polarization in
America, potentially due to our two-party election sys-
tem, has generated renewed focus on election mecha-
nisms. [2] Additionally, while there have been recent
movements (i.e. the recent new primary system in Cal-
ifornia as of 2012) to reduce polarization and moder-
ate recent elections, preliminary studies show an in-
conclusive change in resulting outcome. [3]
Electoral systems are one of the crucial elements
of a well-functioning democracy. [17] Moreover, be-
cause electoral systems influence important political
outcomes, they impact legislative behavior, electoral
competition, the relationship between votes and seats
in parliaments, and the number of parties in govern-
ment. [17] For example, our two-party system is a
direct result of our plurality system. [16] Changing
our election mechanism could result in a completely
different party dynamic and new representatives, not
to mention a complete change of the millions of dol-
lars of infrastructure built under the two-party sys-
tem. Finally, election mechanisms can potentially
impact the direction of policies. By electing candi-
dates of different polarity or incentivizing candidates
to pander towards certain populations or demograph-
ics, these mechanisms can potentially influence policy
and thereby impact the lives of millions. As shown by
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Chile’s 1973 presidential election, a country’s election
mechanism can either bolster or endanger the very fab-
ric of its democracy.
2 Problem Statement
Motivated by the theory that different election sys-
tems can affect the outcome of elections, we investi-
gate how election systems can specifically affect the
election of polarized vs. moderate candidates. Since
there was no existing ranked list of American citizens
preferences from the 2016 election results, we col-
lected our own dataset, surveying over 750 U.S. cit-
izens. Subsequently, we normalized our data and put
it to the test, running several election mechanisms to
reach preliminary conclusions on which systems favor
certain candidates over others.
As explained in the following section, polarization
and radicalization is an increasing topic of interest in
Political Science. However, we chose this project be-
cause we saw a gap between a very interesting topic
and Computer Science’s emphasis on mechanism de-
sign. By collecting our own dataset and applying
mechanisms learned in this class and elsewhere, we
hope this can be a significant first step in analyzing the
effect of voting mechanisms on election results, and
ultimately, their policy implications. Following this,
we plan to share these results and further collaborate
with professors in the field.
3 Related Work
We approached our literature review from two
angles, 1) voting mechanism design and 2) research
on polarization:
Voting Mechanisms
Existing research shows that given the same race,
different mechanisms can elect different candidates.
[18] Kenneth Arrow, Nobel Prize winning Economist,
began work on this with the RAND Corporation
in 1951, examining social choice theory. Arrow’s
paradox showed that when voters have three or
more distinct options, there exists no ranked voting
electoral system that can both convert the ranked
preferences of individuals into a community-wide
ranking while satisfying the following conditions:
unrestricted domain, non-dictatorship, independence
of irrelevant alternatives and Pareto efficiency. [4]
Voting mechanisms have been studied to various
degrees, with mechanisms offered by Marquis de
Condorcet [6], A.H. Copeland [8], Clyde Coombs [7],
and Duncan Black [5]. Moreover, research has been
done on more advanced / complicated mechanisms
like minimum violations [9], ranked pairs [10], min-
max rule, and the Kendall-Wei power rankings, which
are often used in sports. Nobel Laureates, computer
scientists, and economists have conducted significant
research on voting mechanisms. Nevertheless, as of
today, work remains with regard to an analysis on
election mechanisms’ affect on reducing polarization.
Polarization
Similarly, in political science, many scholars have
researched polarization and its increase in American
politics. However, less focus has been placed on how
different voting mechanisms would result in different
voting outcomes.
Significant research has been done by Stanford Uni-
versity scholars like Andy Hall, Shanto Iyengar, Bruce
Cain, and David Brady, on polarization and election
systems. Hall, Political Science Professor at Stanford,
claims that "U.S. legislatures have become increas-
ingly polarized and dysfunctional in part because of
how difficult running for and holding office is." Com-
bining theoretical and empirical evidence, he "shows
how voters are forced to elect extremists because mod-
erates don’t run for office, and document[s] how the
rising costs of running for office, and the falling ben-
efits of holding office, have deterred moderates from
running."[12] Moreover, Hall has researched results
in primaries [13], and concludes that extremists and
their affiliated party tend to suffer penalties in the
general election. To Hall, the general election sys-
tem tends to have a moderating effect on elections in
the House of Representatives in America. Similarly,
Shanto Iyengar, another Political Science Professor,
provides compelling evidence to support growing po-
larization in America. [14] Iyengar’s research raises
important questions, many of which are beyond the
scope of this paper.
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Finally, there exists significant academic consensus
on the importance of election systems on policy out-
comes. Amartya Sen’s work on social choice [11]
sets up a compelling argument on the benefits and
drawbacks of majority voting in deciding on issues
of poverty and welfare. Additionally, Rickard puts
significant effort in analyzing the impact of electoral
systems on policy outcomes, but fails to reach signif-
icant conclusions on how or why this impact exists.
[17] With this significant backdrop and consensus that
election systems help define policy outcomes, we turn
our focus to analyzing the impact of election mecha-
nisms on electing moderate or polarized candidates.
4 Methods
4.1 Data Collection
Since the U.S. Presidential election does not have
voters provide a ranked list of candidate preferences,
we decided to collect our own data set for the purpose
of this project. The reasons were twofold: we did not
see similar compelling data on an individual scale, and
we believed this data set would be a helpful first step
for our research as well as future publications by oth-
ers. While we could have chosen (and plan on sur-
veying other elections) we selected the USA election
because of the simplicity and reliability of garnering
high user numbers and building a first proof of con-
cept.
In terms of specific methodology, we set up a Me-
chanical Turk account and surveyed over 700 respon-
dents, all of which were domiciled in America and
represented a fairly diverse set of geographical respon-
dents. As one of our members has used mTurk in prior
research investigating a causal link between the anti-
vaccination movement and Donald Trump’s media
presence, we had good experience in designing HIT
tests. We believe that we received genuine responses;
however, there are significant risks in assumption. For
instance, users could have evaded mTurk’s Bot Detec-
tion systems or could have answered dishonestly or
randomly. Nevertheless, for a first crack, our paper fo-
cuses more on the mechanism design and leaves vali-
dation of results to subsequent, better funded research
projects.
Our survey, entitled US 2016 Presidential Election
Preferences, took on average 2 minutes and 11
seconds, asked 8 questions, and was powered by
Qualtrics. Our first five questions surveyed demo-
graphics (age, gender, race, party preference, and
whether they voted in 2016). Subsequently, we ask
participants to rank 8 candidates (Gary Johnson, Jill
Stein, Donald Trump, Marco Rubio, Bernie Sanders,
Ted Cruz, Gary Johnson, John Kasich), and to specify
the last candidate rank they thought would make
an acceptable President. We used this question for
measuring approval voting [16] and our newly defined
"Polarization Rule". Finally, we ask voters to select
a candidate for the first round of a plurality with
runoff election (French election) setup. This question
yielded interesting results, which we address later on.
Ethical Considerations
As an important aside, we encountered two major
ethical considerations regarding our usage of Mechan-
ical Turk and Qualtrics. We spent 3 cents per survey
response (2 cents to Turker, 1 cent to mTurk), due in
part to making our survey keywords attractive (easy,
quick, survey, demographics, Stanford, voting). It was
remarkable to get potent data for such a reasonable
price, and we got universally positive feedback for
keeping our survey short and contained. However, the
fact remains that these surveyors were paid an aver-
age of $0.60 an hour, which does not come close to a
proper working wage.
Secondly, our Qualtrics survey also released confi-
dential information, specifically the exact latitude and
longitude of the surveyed location. When we plugged
in our survey geographics into Google Maps to as-
certain how diverse our surveyed population, we had
the ability to see with Street View the actual house in
which the survey was completed. In the future, re-
searchers, Qualtrics, and Mechanical Turk should be
more careful to address the potential privacy risks of
completing similar surveys to ours.
4.2 Accounting for Voter Demographics
Though we collected a large number of survey re-
sponses through Mechanical Turk, the population that
fills out Mechanical Turk surveys does not represent
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the general US population. In general, we found that
the average Mechanical Turk user skews younger and
more likely to be a Democrat or Independent than
the average US voter. To account for this difference,
we included a demographic information section in our
survey to identify voters. In addition, we asked partic-
ipants to also indicate whether they had voted or not
in the 2016 election. Using these survey answers, we
were able to determine the demographic breakdown of
our survey participants and normalize result.
When writing the survey, we wanted our questions
to align with the demographics outlined in the 2016
Election Exit Polls.[20] In doing so, it was easy to de-
termine how our participants compared to the voters
in the 2016 election. After determining the demo-
graphic breakdown, we then calculated a correction
constant based on the representation of a demographic
in the 2016 election divided by the representation of
the same demographic in our survey. We then com-
bined the correction constants across all of the demo-
graphics we collected to weight each of our partici-
pants’ votes correctly. With this, we hoped to make
our results more representative of the 2016 voter pop-
ulation and correct for potential participant bias. How-
ever, one demographic we did not sample for was par-
ticipant income. The impact of this decision will be
further discussed in later sections.
4.3 Proposed Mechanisms
4.3.1 Existing Mechanisms
Simple Plurality
The most basic voting mechanism is when each
voter submits a single vote for a candidate and the
winner is the candidate with the most votes. Most of
the elections in the United States utilize this simple
plurality voting rule, and it is one of the reasons for
the emergence of the two-party system.[16] This
mechanism is not strategy-proof, as voters have more
incentive to vote for the candidate they like the most
that also has a high chance of winning instead of the
candidate that they might actually prefer.
Plurality with Runoff
An extension of the simple plurality mechanism is
to have an initial round similar to a simple plurality
vote where voters submit a single vote. However, a
winner is not decided unless a candidate holds the
majority of the votes. If there is no clear winner after
this initial round of voting, a runoff is held between
the two candidates with the highest number of votes.
In this second round, voters then choose either of the
two potential candidates. Although the second round
does determine the truthful preferred candidate for
voters, voters have an incentive in the initial round to
vote for a candidate they believe will end up in the
final runoff.
Ranked Choice
In a ranked choice voting mechanism, also known
as single transferable vote or instant-runoff voting,
voters submit a ranked list of the candidates instead
of just their first choice. If a candidate receives the
majority of the first place rankings then they win
the election. Otherwise, the candidate with the least
amount of first-place rankings is removed from the
election and the lists are reconsidered excluding them.
This process continues until one candidate receives
a majority of the votes, and they are declared the
winner. This mechanism is also not strategy-proof,
but it is tougher to game ranked choice voting than it
is to game the two plurality methods discussed above.
Some ranked choice mechanisms don’t require voters
to rank all of the candidates in the election, but for
this project, we assume that all of the candidates are
ranked.[18]
Coombs’ Method
A similar method to Ranked Choice or Instant-
Runoff Voting is Coombs’ Method.[7] Voters still sub-
mit a ranked list of their choices, but instead of elim-
inating candidates based on who has the least number
of first-place votes, Coombs’ Method instead elimi-
nates candidates based on who has the most last-place
votes. After removing the candidate with the most
last-place votes, the lists are recomputed similarly to
Ranked Choice voting. This process continues until
there is one candidate remaining in the election, who
is declared the winner. Though the process seems sim-
ilar to Ranked Choice voting, eliminating the candi-
date that is least liked (i.e. has the most number of last
4
place votes) can result in a much different outcome.
Borda Count
The Borda count voting mechanism also has voters
submit their ranked choices, but instead of removing
candidates like the ranked choice mechanism it com-
putes a score. For each ranked list a candidate receives
a score based on how they were placed in the list. If a
candidate is the first choice, then they receive a score
of |A| where |A| represents the number of candidates
in the election. If the candidate is the second choice,
they receive a score of |A|−1. This continues until the
last choice candidate, who receives a score of 1. The
scores are then summed up across all of the voters’
lists, and the candidate with the highest Borda count
wins the election. Again, this mechanism is also not
strategy-proof, as voters are incentivized to rank the
closest competitor to their preferred candidate last in-
stead of at their truthful ranking.[18]
Approval Voting
This mechanism asks voters to submit a set of can-
didates that they approve of instead of ranking all of
the candidates. If candidates are within this set, then
they receive a vote. The votes are then summed across
all of the submitted sets of approved candidates, and
the candidate with the most votes is deemed the "most
approved" and wins the election.[15] Again, this is
not strategy-proof because voters will not include
competitors to their top choice in their approval set
even if they truthfully approve of them.
Copeland Rule
The Copeland Rule deals with pair-wise victories
and is used to determine the Condorcet winner.[8] A
formal definition of a Condorcet winner and its pres-
ence in various voting rules is discussed in Section 5.
In this voting rule, each voter submits their ranked
choices. However, instead of tallying a score or re-
moving candidates based on some policy, the candi-
dates are ordered in terms of their head to head vic-
tories against the other candidates minus their head
to head defeats. A head to head victory is found if,
throughout all of the ranked lists, a candidate is ranked
higher than another candidate a majority of the time.
4.3.2 Novel Mechanisms
In addition to implementing the existing mecha-
nisms described above, we also designed two new
mechanisms with the aim of achieving a different
election outcome.
Moderation Rule
In this rule, we combine standard Ranked Choice
voting with Coombs’ rule, alternating which candidate
to return. Ideally, this would balance out removing
candidates that are not the most liked and also the most
disliked. The rule is as follows.
Algorithm 1 Moderation Rule
while more than one candidate remains do
Calculate first-place vote totals
Remove candidate with least first-place votes
if one candidate remains then
return remaining candidate
end if
Recompute ranked lists
Calculate last-place vote totals
Remove candidate with most last-place votes
Redo ranked lists without the removed candidate
end while
return remaining candidate
Though this rule decides to start by removing the
candidate with the least first-place votes, a variation
could start by removing the candidate with the most
last-place votes instead.
Polarization Rule
We created the Polarization Rule with the intent of
electing the candidate for whom voters would have the
least negative reaction. To do this, we made the policy
outlined in Algorithm 2.
This policy decreases a candidates score the fur-
ther away they are from a voter’s acceptable threshold.
The decision to square this distance was made because
we wanted to emphasize the increase of being the last
place in a voter’s ranked list. The candidate with the
least negative final score will be declared the winner,
because they will have accumulated the lowest nega-
tive reaction from voters. Ideally, the result of this type
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Algorithm 2 Polarization Rule
for every voter ranked list do
i←− index of last acceptable candidate in list
for index j where i < j ≤ number of candidates
do
candidate score -= (j − i)2
end for
end for
return candidate scores
of election would be met with the least resistance be-
cause the average voter would be the least upset about
the elected candidate winning.
5 Properties of Mechanisms
Condorcet Condition
Before discussing the properties of each mecha-
nism, the concept of a Condorcet winner should be
brought up. Theorized by Marquis de Condorcet in
1785, the Condorcet winner is a candidate that defeats
all other candidates in head-to-head victories.[6]
These head-to-head victories are determined by sum-
ming up the number of times a candidate is ranked
higher than another candidate in voters’ choices and
seeing which candidate is ranked higher the majority
of the time. The Condorcet winner can be seen as
the most liked candidate in the election, because they
are the candidate that is on average more preferred
than every other candidate. However, there does not
necessarily have to be a Condorcet winner in every
election, as shown in Table 1.
Voter 1 Voter 2 Voter 3
A B C
B C A
C A B
Table 1: Election without Condorcet Winner
In this example, there are three candidates, A, B,
and C, and three voters. As seen in their ranked lists
above, Candidate A wins the head-to-head matchup
against B but loses to C, and B wins the head-to-head
matchup against C. This means that there is no
clear Condorcet winner that wins against all other
candidates.
Since a Condorcet winner is not guaranteed,
Condorcet elections require some tiebreaker method
in the case where there is a tie. However, when
a Condorcet winner does exist, it could be argued
that any mechanism should select the Condorcet
winner.[16] We will see, however, that many of the
mechanisms reviewed in this project do not satisfy
the Condorcet condition, meaning that they don’t
necessarily choose the Condorcet winner if one exists.
Existing Mechanisms and the Condorcet Condition
Previous work has shown that the plurality rule,
ranked-choice voting, and the Borda count do not
satisfy the Condorcet Condition, as there are examples
of elections where a Condorcet winner does not win
the election.[22] Since the plurality rule does not
satisfy the Condorcet Condition, it extends from that
that the plurality with runoff also does not satisfy the
Condorcet Condition. The same argument can be said
for ranked-choice voting not satisfying the Condorcet
Condition and Coombs’ Method not satisfying the
Condorcet Condition, because Coombs’ Method is
just a variation on how to remove the candidates.
The approval voting method also does not satisfy
the Condorcet Condition, which can be seen in
Table 2. The underlined candidate represents the last
acceptable candidate in a voter’s ranked list. In this
Voter 1 Voter 2 Voter 3 Voter 4 Voter 5
A A C C B
B B B B A
C C A A C
Table 2: Approval Voting Example
example, B is the Condorcet winner, but A wins the
election because it is included in the most approval
voting sets.
The Copeland Rule satisfies the Condorcet con-
dition. To prove this, assume there is a Condorcet
winner in the election. This means they will have
won |A| − 1 matchups against all of the other
candidates. Any other candidate could have won at
most |A| − 2 matchups because they would have lost
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Figure 1: Aggregate of ranking per candidate
to the Condorcet winner. Since the Copeland Rule
computes a winner based on candidates’ head-to-head
matchups, then the Condorcet winner will win the
election because they are guaranteed to have more
head-to-head victories. Therefore, the Copeland Rule
satisfies the Condorcet condition.[21]
Novel Mechanisms and the Condorcet Condition
The Moderation Rule that was proposed in the pre-
vious section does not satisfy the Condorcet Condi-
tion. See the following election described in Table 3
for a counterexample.
Voter 1 Voter 2 Voter 3 Voter 4 Voter 5
A A C C B
B B B B A
C C A A C
Table 3: Moderation Rule Example
This example resembles the Approval Voting Ex-
ample in Table 2, but there are no acceptable bound-
aries. Candidate B is still the Condorcet Winner, but
they are removed in the first round of the Moderation
Rule because they have the least number of first-place
votes.
The Polarization Rule also does not satisfy the Con-
dorcet condition. A counter-example shows this in Ta-
ble 4. Similar to the Approval Voting Example, the last
acceptable candidate for each list is underlined.
Voter 1 Voter 2 Voter 3
B B A
A A C
C C B
Table 4: Polarization Rule Example
In this example, B is again the Condorcet winner,
but since they are the only candidate that is ever out-
side the acceptable boundary, they receive the highest
polarization score and are therefore guaranteed to lose.
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6 Results
6.1 Overview
Based on every mechanism we tested, the majority
result is that Bernie Sanders is the winner of the 2016
election (Table 14). Based on our data, Bernie Sanders
is also a Condorcet Winner, since he wins every single
matchup in Copeland’s Rule.(Table 10)
One of the elections which Bernie Sanders loses
is in our proposed Polarization Rule, which penalizes
Bernie Sanders for having a significantly higher num-
ber of low ranks compared to candidates Gary Johnson
and Marco Rubio (Table 1).
6.2 Plurality Results
The only other case where Bernie Sanders loses is
in the Simple Plurality mechanism (Table 5), where
the winner is Donald Trump. While this is the simplest
mechanism to understand and implement, the trade-off
is that the mechanism does not take into account other
factors, such as the overwhelming amount of voters
who ranked Donald Trump last. (Table 1)
Ranking Candidate Score
1 Donald Trump 232
2 Bernie Sanders 192
3 Hillary Clinton 162
4 Gary Johnson 57
5 John Kasich 56
6 Marco Rubio 38
7 Ted Cruz 21
8 Jill Stein 12
Table 5: Simple Plurality
6.3 Plurality with Runoff Results
The top two candidates selected after the initial
round are Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump, fol-
lowed by a close showdown which results in a Bernie
Sanders victory by 3 votes.
It is worth noting that the initial round votes submit-
ted for this question on the survey are different than
the top ranks submitted by voters (see table 5 vs table
6). The issues of truthfulness and strategic voting will
be addressed in the subsequent section.
Ranking Candidate Score Runoff Score
1 Bernie Sanders 224 336
2 Donald Trump 201 333
3 Hillary Clinton 164 N/A
4 John Kasich 69 N/A
5 Marco Rubio 44 N/A
6 Gary Johnson 39 N/A
7 Ted Cruz 21 N/A
8 Jill Stein 8 N/A
Table 6: Plurality with Runoff
6.4 Approval Voting Results
Bernie Sanders is included as an acceptable candi-
date by most voters, and he therefore wins the Ap-
proval Voting election. Out of all mechanisms, Ap-
proval Voting is a fairly close contest between all 8
candidates.
Ranking Candidate Score
1 Bernie Sanders 265
2 Hillary Clinton 249
3 Donald Trump 230
4 Gary Johnson 212
5 Marco Rubio 198
6 Ted Cruz 190
7 John Kasich 171
8 Jill Stein 157
Table 7: Approval Voting
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6.5 Ranked Choice Results
While Ranked Choice does not penalize low ranks
as directly as Coombs’ Method, in further iterations of
the algorithm, low ranks will remain low, while middle
ranks are more likely to be pushed towards the top.
Ranking Candidate Score
1 Bernie Sanders 8
2 Donald Trump 7
3 Hillary Clinton 6
4 Gary Johnson 5
5 John Kasich 4
6 Marco Rubio 3
7 Ted Cruz 2
8 Jill Stein 1
Table 8: Ranked Choice
6.6 Coombs’ Method Results
Coombs’ Method penalized candidates with many
low ranks, which is why we see Hillary Clinton and
Donald Trump at the bottom of the list. The intuition
behind this mechanism is that it will elected the "least
hated candidate."
Ranking Candidate Score
1 Bernie Sanders 8
2 Gary Johnson 7
3 Jill Stein 6
4 Marco Rubio 5
5 John Kasich 4
6 Ted Cruz 3
7 Hillary Clinton 2
8 Donald Trump 1
Table 9: Coombs’ Method
6.7 Copeland’s Rule Results
Copeland’s Rule is the only mechanism which
will elect a Condorcet winner, which is why Bernie
Sanders also won this mechanism (Table 10).
On the other end, Donald Trump loses every pair-
wise match up, giving him a score of -7. If our data
and computations are a representation of the popula-
tion, this is making a very strong statement about the
current state of the United States presidential election
system, since it elected a candidate that should lose
every direct match up with another top candidate.
Ranking Candidate Score
1 Bernie Sanders 7
2 Gary Johnson 5
3 Hillary Clinton 3
4 Jill Stein 1
5 Marco Rubio -1
6 Ted Cruz -3
7 John Kasich -5
8 Donald Trump -7
Table 10: Copeland’s Rule
6.8 Borda Count Results
While Bernie Sanders continues to win in the
Borda Count mechanism, Gary Johnson places sec-
ond, which occurs in a total of four mechanisms (ta-
bles 9, 10, 11 12). Since Gary Johnson only received
approximately one percent of the popular vote in the
2016 presidential election [19], the outcomes of our
mechanisms indicate that Gary Johnson was a fairly
strong candidate.
Ranking Candidate Score
1 Bernie Sanders 4108
2 Gary Johnson 3929
3 Hillary Clinton 3556
4 Marco Rubio 3520
5 Donald Trump 3326
6 Jill Stein 3260
7 John Kasich 3102
8 Ted Cruz 3018
Table 11: Borda Count
6.9 Moderation Rule Results
Since this mechanism is a hybrid of Coombs’
Method and Ranked Choice, it shared the same win-
ner once again in Bernie Sanders (Table 12). One
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of the nice features that our Moderation Rule has,
is that it guarantees that we will not see a winner
in candidates which perform very poorly in either
Coombs’ Method or Ranked Choice. Notice that Don-
ald Trump places last in Coombs’ Method Approval
Votingtable:coombs), but places second in Ranked
Choice (Table 8). Conversely, Jill Stein places last in
Coombs’ Method, but third in Ranked Choice. The
Moderation Rule incorporates indicators from both
mechanisms, resulting in Donald Trump and Jill Stein
as the bottom two ranks in the outcome.
Ranking Candidate Score
1 Bernie Sanders 8
2 Gary Johnson 7
3 Ted Cruz 6
4 John Kasich 5
5 Hillary Clinton 4
6 Marco Rubio 3
7 Donald Trump 2
8 Jill Stein 1
Table 12: Moderation Rule
6.10 Candidate Polarization
When observing the distributions of rankings per
candidate in table 1, we notice a pattern between cer-
tain candidates’ distributions. We can define a general
notion of the polarity of a candidate by observing the
extremes of ranks: a polar candidate should be both fa-
vorite and most hated by voters. The ranking distribu-
tion of candidates Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton
demonstrate this concept – they have many ranks of 1
and 8 and very few middle ranks of 4 and 5. On the
other hand, the distributions of candidates like Marco
Rubio and Gary Johnson represent the opposite effect
– they have many votes which rank them between 3
and 6, and very few ranks of 1 and 8.
We used these concepts as motivation to develop a
new metric which takes into account the polarity of
an unacceptable candidate, which had already been
outlined in algorithm 2. This mechanism penalized
candidates with polar voting rankings such as Donald
Trump, while rewarded candidates like Marco Rubio
and Gary Johnson as seen in table 13. To provide an
intuition behind the function of the Polarization Rule,
we claim that Gary Johnson is a clear winner because
he frequently occurs on voters’ acceptable lists (Table
7). Also, for votes where he is not on the acceptable
list, Gary Johnson seldom occurs toward the bottom of
the rankings, granting him a low penalty. The outcome
here is that by electing Gary Johnson, the negative re-
action by voters would be minimized.
Ranking Candidate Score
1 Gary Johnson -1656
2 Marco Rubio -2323
3 Bernie Sanders -2500
4 Jill Stein -2761
5 John Kasich -3779
6 Ted Cruz -4546
7 Hillary Clinton -4799
8 Donald Trump -6058
Table 13: Polarization Rule
7 Discussion
7.1 Truthfulness
Whenever voting mechanisms are applied, the issue
of truthfulness must be discussed. For the purposes
of this project, we assumed that the ranked list par-
ticipants submitted was based on their truthful prefer-
ences. Participants did not know the different voting
mechanisms that would be used in this project, so it is
unlikely that they would have submitted an untruthful
ranked list. However, some participants in our survey
commented that they did not know some of the can-
didates that we had them rank. This could affect how
the ranked lists were made because ignorance of a can-
didate could theoretically cause them to appear more
towards the middle of people’s lists. However, igno-
rance about some of the candidates could also be rep-
resentative of the normal United States election, where
voters typically do not know everything about all of
the candidates.
One interesting finding regarding truthfulness ap-
peared in the question asking for a first round vote
in the plurality with runoff mechanism. Around 20
percent of our participants voted for a different can-
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didate than the first choice in their ranked list. Addi-
tionally, the most compelling switch happened when a
voter had a first choice of Donald Trump but submitted
a vote for Bernie Sanders. Our hypothesis for this is
based on further analysis of these voters that switched,
because many of these voters who ranked Donald
Trump first also approved of Bernie Sanders. From
this, we theorize that since Trump, Sanders, and Clin-
ton were the three leading candidates in the 2016 Pres-
idential Election, these voters wanted to ensure that
the two candidates who ended up in the runoff were
both candidates that they found acceptable. Therefore,
if they assumed Trump would make it into the final
runoff without their vote, they would vote for another
popular candidate they approved of to make sure the
resulting winner was acceptable to them. This is just
conjecture, however, and without gathering more data
we cannot conclude anything.
7.2 Selecting An Optimal Mechanism
What factors are most important when deciding on
an election mechanism for a democracy? Based on
our research and the surrounding literature review, we
arrive at a few themes.
Comprehensibility
While there are multiple reasons why plurality is
the most widely accepted voting mechanism, the most
obvious reason is its simplicity. A properly function-
ing democracy must have a comprehensible voting
mechanism and may potentially need to sacrifice
effective fair voting in order to be simple enough for
all to understand. Ideally, democracies should not
want to make an election mechanism so complicated
that only an elite few can understand or critique on
the election. Failing to do this can potentially frustrate
voters or raise suspicion in the reliability of their
voting system. Thus, most alternatives to plurality
vote involve simple, intelligible modifications. These
include the Borda Count, the primary system, ap-
proval voting, or plurality rule with runoff.[16][4]
Ease Of Implementation
Similar to having a comprehensible voting mecha-
nism, an easily implementable voting system is criti-
cal. In a country like America, voting occurs in places
of various technological literacy and sophistication.
Additionally, citizens vote through various methods
like absentee ballots, mail-in voting, and in-person
voting, depending on their job or background.
A proper voting mechanism should not be too com-
plicated to be correctly implemented. Additionally,
it must not threaten voter turnout or increase voter
disenfranchisement because of a difficulty in partici-
pation. Finally, a realistic voting mechanism should
be auditable at scale, both to maintain confidence
in the system and also to protect against sabotage.
Regarding our Moderation Rule and Polarization
Rules, it is easy to understand what these rules are
doing, but much harder for the everyday voter or
voting official to debate the pros and cons of the
strategy.
Truthfulness
Similar to Section 7.1, we ideally want voters to
vote in a truthful fashion, rather than incentivizing
citizens to change their preferences to adjust to the
complications of the system. As we’ve addressed
earlier, it is very difficult to ascertain truthfulness
with many election mechanisms, including ours. This
would be an excellent subject for further study.
Reducing Partiality
Another important consideration is making sure
that candidates are not incentivized to ignore certain
segments of the voting population to achieve victory.
Thus, for example, in America, an election mecha-
nism should disincentivize politicians to campaign
solely in cities or conversely campaign solely in rural
areas.
Reducing Polarization
Finally, as we cover in this paper, we believe
that building election mechanisms that reduce the
election of polarized candidates can increase stability
and improve democracy. While there are certainly
benefits to allowing for radical ideas and spirit in our
government, the erosion of Chile’s democracy [1], as
well as examples of other non-majority plurality rule
countries, demonstrate the threat to stability certain
election mechanisms can have. Stability essentially.
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In this way, our current two-party system usually
disincentivizes intense polarization [12]; however, a
few of our proposed methods might achieve this effect
better.
8 Future Work
Based on our findings in this project, our next steps
would be to expand our mechanism implementations
to other US elections as well as elections in other
democracies. This would help to gather a better un-
derstanding of the average impact of our findings in-
stead of limiting it to the scope of one election. Addi-
tionally, this would allow us to compare the impact of
different mechanisms between different democracies.
Another direction would be to implement additional
voting mechanisms such as quadratic voting. We
wanted to keep our Qualtrics survey simple to maxi-
mize the number of responses. Therefore, this project
did not include quadratic voting because it would have
been more difficult for participants to quickly under-
stand. If we were to send out an additional survey, it
would be interesting to see the result of quadratic vot-
ing and compare it to the other mechanisms we have
already implemented.
Lastly, many of the research papers in our literature
review came from current professors at Stanford’s De-
partment of Political Science. If we were to continue
working on this project, we would like to contact An-
drew Hall, Shanto Iyengar, and Bruce Cain because
their work deals with incentives in election mecha-
nisms. Specifically, Andrew Hall’s work [12][13] has
many parallels with this project, which opens up the
possibility for future collaboration.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we outline various election mecha-
nisms and evaluate them on the 2016 United States
Presidential Election. To do this, we collected data
on voter preferences using Mechanical Turk and ex-
trapolated these findings to represent the population
that voted in 2016. After analyzing these results, we
also define two novel mechanisms with the purpose of
reducing polarization. Finally, we identify key flaws
in certain mechanisms and discuss the trade-offs be-
tween all of the implemented voting rules. The result
of this paper demonstrates the impact a voting mech-
anism has on democratic elections. This analysis war-
rants a deeper discussion of the current implementa-
tion of the United States’ electoral system.
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Appendix
Candidates/Mechanisms Plurality w/ Runoff Approval RC Coombs Copeland Borda Moderation Polarization
Gary Johnson 4 6 4 4 2 2 2 2 1
Hillary Clinton 3 3 2 3 7 3 3 5 7
Jill Stein 8 8 8 8 3 4 6 8 4
Donald Trump 1 2 3 2 8 8 5 7 8
Marco Rubio 6 5 5 6 4 5 4 6 2
Bernie Sanders 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3
Ted Cruz 7 7 6 7 6 6 8 3 6
John Kasich 5 4 7 5 5 7 7 4 5
Table 14: Table of mechanism rankings
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